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IV.

FRANCMSE LAW

Jimenez v. BP Oil, Inc.: The Fourth Circuit'sRepsonse to
Congress' Attempt to Balance The Interests of Petroleum
Franchisorsand Franchisees in the Petroleum Marketing
PracticesAct
The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act of 1978 (PMPA)' established
federal standards that govern a franchisor's ability to terminate or to fail
to renew a franchise for the retail distribution of petroleum products. 2 In
enacting the PMPA, Congress sought to develop a uniform system for
regulating petroleum franchises. 3 Congress, to facilitate a uniform system
for regulating petroleum franchises, provided that the PMPA preempts state
laws that regulate subject areas that the PMPA covers. 4 In interpreting the

1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841 (1982).
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b) (1982) (identifying grounds upon which franchisor may
terminate or fail to renew franchise agreement). The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act
(PMPA) provides an exhaustive list of the grounds upon which a franchisor either may
terminate a franchise agreement during the course of a franchise, or may fail to renew a
franchise agreement upon the natural expiration of the franchise. Id. at § 2802(b)(2)-(b)(3).
Section 2802(b)(2) of the PMPA provides five separate grounds for a valid termination or
nonrenewal of a petroleum franchise. Id. at § 2802(b)(2). First, a franchisor may terminate or
fail to renew a franchise if the franchisee fails to comply with a reasonable and material
condition of the franchise agreement. Id. at § 2802(b)(2)(A). Second, a franchisor may terminate
or fail to renew a franchise under the PMPA if the franchisee fails to exert a good faith
effort in carrying out the provisions of the franchise agreement. Id. at § 2802(b)(2)(B). Third,
if an event occurs that makes termination or nonrenewal reasonable, a franchisor validly may
terminate or fail to renew a franchisee's franchise. Id. at §2802(b)(2)(C). Fourth, a franchisor
may terminate or fail to renew a franchise agreement if the franchisor and franchisee agree
in writing to terminate or not to renew a franchise agreement. Id. at § 2802(b)(2)(D). Fifth,
a franchisor may terminate or fail to renew a franchise agreement if the franchisor makes a
good faith determination, based on changes in relevant circumstances, to withdraw from the
geographic market. Id. at § 2802(b)(2)(E). The PMPA further provides that a franchisor may
fail to renew, but may not terminate, a franchise if a franchisee refuses to accept the franchisor's
changes or additions to the franchise agreement, if the franchisor proposed the changes or
additions in good faith and in the normal course of the franchisor's business. Id. at §
2802(b)(3)(A).
3. See S. REP. No. 731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, 19, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONGo. & ADmw. NEws 873, 877 (discussing Congress' recognition of need for uniform set of
laws to regulate grounds for termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises). The Senate
Report to the PMPA notes that prior to the PMPA many states had enacted legislation which
regulated petroleum franchises. Id. at 19, 1978 U.S. CODE CONo. & ADmw. NEws at 877. The
Senate Report further noted that states had regulated petroleum franchises differently, thus
producing an uneven set of state rules that governed franchise relationships. Id.
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 2806(a) (1982) (identifying PMPA's preemptive scope over state
laws that regulate petroleum franchises). Section 2806(a) of the PMPA stipulates that the
PMPA preempts state laws that regulate the termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises
inconsistently with the terms of the PMPA. Id.
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scope of the PMPA's preemption clause, courts generally have agreed that

the PMPA preempts state statutes that regulate the termination or nonre5
newal of petroleum franchises inconsistently with the terms of the PMPA.
Courts, however, have defined consistency with the PMPA in different
ways. 6 Some courts have interpreted the PMPA's preemption clause to
preempt all state laws that regulate any aspect of the termination or

nonrenewal of petroleum franchises. 7 Other courts have interpreted the
PMPA's preemption clause to preempt only state laws that regulate the

grounds, procedures, and notice requirements for termination or nonrenewal
of petroleum franchises.8 Finally, a third group of courts has found that

5. See, e.g., In re Herbert, 806 F.2d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that PMPA
preempts all state laws that are inconsistent with PMPA); Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Department
of Consumer Affairs, 793 F.2d 431, 434 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that state laws which regulate
termination, renewal, or notice requirements for termination of petroleum franchises must
follow provisions in PMPA); Bellmore v. Mobil Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 300, 305 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding that state laws which regulate areas that PMPA covers must follow provisions in
PMPA); see generally U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (containing supremacy clause, which states
that federal laws are superior to state laws that contradict federal laws); Michigan Canners &
Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984) (noting that
doctrine of federal preemption of state laws arises under supremacy clause of United States
Constitution); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 17 (1824) (noting that underlying rationale of
preemption doctrine is that supremacy clause invalidates state laws that interfere with or
contradict federal laws).
If Congress expressly has claimed exclusive authority to regulate a given field, then
federal laws preempt conflicting state laws that regulate the same field. Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). In the absence of express congressional intent that federal laws
will preempt state laws in a given field, federal laws still may preempt state laws if Congress
has shown an intent to occupy a field with federal regulation, and thus to preclude states
from supplementing the federal regulation with state laws. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-204 (1983). Furthermore,
if Congress permits simultaneous state and federal regulation of a substantive area, federal
laws preempt state laws if the state laws frustrate Congress' accomplishment of Congress'
objectives in enacting the federal laws. Id. at 204. If state and federal laws conflict courts
may engage in statutory construction and, in examining a federal act's legislative history, may
attempt to determine the extent to which federal laws preempt state laws. Bellmore, 783 F.2d
at 303. In determining the extent of federal preemption of state laws, courts should examine
the federal law as a whole to determine the congressional objectives and policies behind the
law. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975).
6. See infra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (discussing courts' varying interpretations
of consistency with PMPA's regulation of termination and nonrenewal of petroleum franchises).
7. See In re Herbert, 806 F.2d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that PMPA preempts
state law that provides franchisees rights additional to rights that PMPA provides); Continental
Enters. v. American Oil Co., 808 F.2d 24, 28 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that PMPA preempts
state law if state law action arises out of termination of franchise or is incident of termination).
8. See Consumers Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 804 F.2d 907, 915 (6th Cir. 1986)
(noting that Congress limited PMPA's scope of preemption to preempt only state laws that
substantially address grounds, procedures, and notice requirements for termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises); Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Consumer Affairs,
793 F.2d 431, 434 (1st Cir. 1986) (reasoning that because PMPA regulates only grounds,
procedures, and notice requirements for termination or nonrenewal, PMPA does not give
franchisors substantive right to be free of all state regulation of petroleum franchise agree-

1989]

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

the PMPA preempts state statutes that regulate substantive aspects of
petroleum franchises if the courts' enforcement of the state statutes effectively would interfere with a franchisor's right to terminate or to fail to
renew a franchise relationship under the PMPA. 9 In Jimenez v. BP Oil,
Inc.10 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
the extent to which Congress intended the PMPA to preempt a Maryland
law that regulated petroleum franchises."
In Jimenez the plaintiffs, Jimenez, Horcasitas, and Palmer, each operated several petroleum franchises in Baltimore and Washington, D.C.
under franchise agreements with the defendant, BP Oil, Inc. (BP).' 2 Pursuant
to BP's decision to withdraw from the Baltimore-Washington, D.C. market,
BP sold BP's interest in all of BP's Baltimore-Washington, D.C. franchises
to Crown Central Petroleum Corporation (Crown). 3 Crown offered the
plaintiffs new franchise agreements with terms that differed from BP's
terms.' 4 Furthermore, Crown notified the plaintiffs that Crown would offer
the plaintiffs the right to purchase any stations that Crown did not plan to

franchise.'"
The plaintiffs sued BP in the United States District Court for the

District of Maryland.

6

The plaintiffs alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint

ments); Bellmore v. Mobil Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that PMPA
does not preempt all state laws that relate to any aspect of termination or nonrenewal but
instead preempts only state laws that regulate grounds, procedures, or notice requirements for
termination or nonrenewal).
9. See Humboldt Oil Co. v. Exxon Co., 823 F.2d 373, 375 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding
that PMPA preempted state law because state law interfered with franchisor's right under
PMPA to disassociate from franchisee), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1575 (1988); Consumers
Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 804 F.2d 907, 915 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that PMPA
preempted state law misrepresentation claim because claim improperly extended PMPA's notice
requirements for termination). But see Bellmore, 783 F.2d at 306 (holding that PMPA did not
preempt state law provision that required franchisor to compensate franchisee for goodwill
that franchisor appropriated because such provision only tenuously and speculatively affected
PMPA's notice requirements); Davis v. Gulf Oil Corp., 485 A.2d 160, 169 (D.C. 1984)
(concluding that, because state law did not address termination directly, PMPA did not
preempt state law that prevented petroleum distributors from operating retail stations even if
state law has effect on franchisor's termination options under PMPA).
10. 853 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1988).
11. Jimenez v. BP Oil, Inc., 853 F.2d 268, 270-71 (4th Cir. 1988).
12. Id. at 269.
13. Id. In Jimenez the franchise agreements between the plaintiffs and BP Oil, Inc. (BP)
expired on April 30, 1985, but BP extended the franchises until October 31, 1985. Id. On
October 17, 1985, BP notified the plaintiffs that BP had sold all of BP's retail stations to
Crown Central Petroleum Corp. (Crown). Id. BP then notified the plaintiffs that BP had
extended the franchise agreements between BP and the plaintiffs until April 1, 1986, the date
on which Crown would assume ownership of the stations. Id.
14. Id. In Jimenez the franchise agreements that Crown offered to the plaintiffs differed
from the BP franchise agreements in that Crown would not allow franchisees, as the franchisees
had done under BP's franchise agreements, to operate more than one franchised station. Id.
15. Id. at 273; see also Jimenez v. BP Oil, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 329, 331 (D. Md. 1987)
(noting that Crown offered multistation franchisees right to purchase any stations that Crown
did not plan to franchise).
16. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 269. In Jimenez the plaintiffs, who each operated more than
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that BP, by failing to offer the plaintiffs the right to purchase the additional
stations that the plaintiffs had operated under franchise agreements with
BP, violated the PMPA.' 7 In addition to the plaintiffs' claims under the
PMPA, the plaintiffs sought to recover compensation under the Maryland

Gasohol and Gasoline Products Marketing Act (Maryland Act)'8 for the
goodwill that the plaintiffs allegedly lost when BP terminated the plaintiffs'

franchises.1 9 After granting BP's motion for summary judgment on the

plaintiffs' claim under the PMPA, 20 the district court determined that the

PMPA did not preempt the Maryland Act's provision that requires franchisors, upon terminating franchises, to make goodwill payments to franchisees. 2' In determining that the PMPA did not preempt the Maryland
Act, the district court in Jimenez reasoned that the state law was supple-

mental to, not inconsistent with, the PMPA. 22 The district court, therefore,

concluded that the plaintiffs could recover goodwill payments from BP for
loss of goodwill under the Maryland Act. 23 BP appealed the decision of the
one station under agreements with BP, rejected Crown's franchise proposals because Crown
refused to allow the plaintiffs to operate more than one station. Id. In Jimenez Crown instead
offered multiple franchisees like the plaintiffs only one station, at a location of Crown's
choosing, with options to buy the remaining stations that Crown did not select for franchise
agreements. Jimenez, 652 F. Supp. at 331.
17. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 269; see also Jimenez, 652 F. Supp. at 332 (discussing plaintiffs'
claim that BP violated PMPA by failing to make timely offer to plaintiffs of right to purchase
remaining stations).
18. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-301-08 (1983).
19. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 270; see also MD. CoM. LAw CODE ANN. § 11-304(i) (requiring
franchisor, if termination is without franchisee's written consent, to pay franchisee full value
of any business goodwill that franchisee enjoyed at time of notification of termination).
20. See Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 270 (noting that district court granted summary judgment
in favor of BP on plaintiffs' claims under PMPA). The district court in Jimenez determined
that BP did not violate the PMPA's requirement that a franchisor offer a franchisee the right
to purchase terminated franchises. Jimenez, 652 F. Supp. at 332-33. The district court,
therefore, granted summary judgment in favor of BP on the PMPA issue, a decision which
the plaintiffs did not appeal to the Fourth Circuit. Id. at 335; see also Jimenez, 853 F.2d at
270 (listing claims before appellate court in Jimenez).
21. Jimenez, 652 F. Supp. at 334-35.
22. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 270; see also Jimenez, 652 F. Supp. at 334-35 (holding that
because Maryland Act's goodwill provision does not regulate terminations or nonrenewals, but
instead merely compensates franchisees for value of goodwill that franchisees lost, Maryland
Act's goodwill provision is supplemental to, and does not conflict with, PMPA).
23. Jimenez, 652 F. Supp. at 334-35. In Jimenez the district court determined that the
Maryland Act does not regulate terminations or nonrenewals of petroleum franchises but
instead provides compensation to franchisees if franchisors lawfully end the franchisees'
franchises. Id. at 334. The district court in Jimenez noted that unjust enrichment may result
if, by continuing to operate stations under new franchise agreements, franchisees recover
goodwill payments while the franchisees retain the franchisees' goodwill. Id. at 334 n.7. The
district court further noted that Crown's imposition of twenty-four hour service requirements
and noncompetition clauses in Crown's franchise agreements partially offset the possibility of
the franchisees' unjust enrichment resulting from the franchisees recovering goodwill payments
while still operating the franchises. Id. The district court further reasoned that Crown probably
compensated BP for the value of the franchisees' goodwill when BP transferred BP's interest
in the franchises to Crown. Id.
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district court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 24
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling that
the plaintiffs could recover, under the Maryland Act, goodwill payments
from BP. 2 The Fourth Circuit in Jimenez initially addressed whether the
district court properly applied the Maryland Act to the Jimenez facts. 26 In
determining whether the Maryland Act required BP to make goodwill
payments to the plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit determined that the Maryland
Act did not state clearly whether the Maryland Act's goodwill provision
applied to a franchisor's complete withdrawal from a particular market. 27
To facilitate analysis of the preemption question, however, the appellate
court in Jimenez assumed that the Maryland Act requires a petroleum
franchisor to compensate a franchisee for the goodwill that the franchisee
loses when the franchisor conducts a complete withdrawal from the franchisee's market. 28
After addressing the application of the Maryland Act to the facts in
Jimenez, the Jimenez court addressed the plaintiffs' claim that the Fourth
Circuit, in considering whether the PMPA preempted the Maryland Act's
goodwill provision, should adopt a grounds/effects interpretation of the
PMPA. 29 Under a grounds/effects interpretation of the PMPA, the PMPA

24. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 270. In Jimenez BP claimed on appeal that the Maryland Act
applied only to franchisors' wrongful conduct, such as unreasonable terminations and nonrenewals, but not to franchisors' complete withdrawals from geographic markets. Id. BP further
claimed on appeal that the PMPA preempted the Maryland Act's goodwill provision. Id.
25. Id. at 274; see infra notes 26-57 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's
holding that BP did not have to make goodwill payments to plaintiffs).
26. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's determination whether district court properly applied Maryland Act to Jimenez facts).
27. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 270. In Jimenez the Fourth Circuit noted that the Maryland
legislature intended the Maryland Act to discourage oil companies, in an attempt to eliminate
price competition among petroleum retail operations, from forcing franchisees to comply with
the oil companies' marketing policies. Id. The Jimenez court further noted that the Maryland
Act's goodwill provision serves the Maryland Act's intended purpose of deterring oil company
takeovers of retail operations only when an oil company forces its way into a market. Id. The
Jimenez court reasoned that the Maryland Act's goodwill provision did not serve the Act's
intended purpose if an oil company withdrew from a market, as BP did in Jimenez. Id. The
Fourth Circuit reasoned that the Maryland legislature probably did not intend that the Maryland
Act's goodwill provision would act as a "toll" on franchisors that exit a market. Id.
28. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Jimenez noted that, because no statutory or common law
interpretations of the Maryland Act existed in Maryland law, the Jimenez court was unable
to analyze completely whether the Maryland Act applied to market withdrawals. Id. As a
result, the Jimenez court assumed that the Maryland legislature did intend the Maryland Act
to apply to franchisors' complete market withdrawals. Id.
29. Id. at 272; see infra notes 30-49 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's
evaluation of grounds/effects interpretation of PMPA's scope of preemption over state laws
that regulate termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises). In Jimenez the plaintiffs
argued that the Fourth Circuit in Barnes v. Gulf Oil Corp. had interpreted the language of
the Senate Report to mean that Congress intended the PMPA to preempt only state statutes
that regulate grounds and procedures for termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises,
but not statutes that regulate the effects of termination or nonrenewal. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at
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preempts only state laws that regulate the grounds for, but not the effects
of, termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises.30 The plaintiffs
argued that under a grounds/effects interpretation of the PMPA, the PMPA
would not preempt the Maryland Act's goodwill provisions because the

PMPA does not preempt state laws that regulate the effects, such as goodwill
payments, of petroleum franchise termination. 3' The Jimenez court deter-

mined that the grounds/effects analysis was not persuasive under the Jimenez
facts. 32 In rejecting a narrow grounds/effects interpretation of the PMPA,
the Fourth Circuit distinguished the Jimenez facts from the facts in other
cases in which courts, upholding state law goodwill provisions, have utilized
3
the grounds/effects analysis.
In distinguishing the Jimenez facts from other cases in which courts
have adopted a grounds/effects analysis, the Fourth Circuit first distinguished BP's complete withdrawal from the Baltimore-Washington, D.C.
petroleum market from the facts in other cases in which franchisors had
not withdrawn completely from franchisees' markets.3 4 The Fourth Circuit
in Jimenez reasoned that, by completely withdrawing from the BaltimoreWashington, D.C. market, BP, unlike franchisors that do not conduct
complete market withdrawals, no longer could benefit from the plaintiffs'
continued operation of the retail stations.35 Because BP could not benefit
from the plaintiffs' continued operation of the retail stations, the Jimenez

court further reasoned that BP did not appropriate the plaintiffs' goodwill.36
The Fourth Circuit in Jimenez noted that the PMPA expressly preempts

state laws that regulate remedies or penalties that apply to the termination

272; see also Barnes v. Gulf Oil Corp., 795 F.2d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that Congress,
in enacting PMPA, intended to establish uniform rules that would govern grounds for
terminating petroleum franchises).
30. See Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 272 (discussing basis of grounds/effects analysis).
31. See id. (discussing plaintiffs' claim that under grounds/effects interpretation PMPA
does not preempt Maryland Act's goodwill provision).
32. Id. at 273; see infra notes 33-49 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's
conclusion that grounds/effects analysis did not apply to Jimenez facts).
33. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 272-73, 273 n.1; see infra notes 34-49 and accompanying text
(discussing Fourth Circuit's rationale for distinguishing Jimenez facts from facts in cases in
which other courts have applied narrow grounds/effects interpretation to PMPA's scope of
preemption); see also supra note 8 (listing courts that have used grounds/effects analysis to
interpret narrowly PMPA's scope of preemption).
34. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 272; see infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (discussing
Fourth Circuit's rationale for distinguishing Jimenez from cases in which other courts adopted
grounds/effects interpretation of PMPA).
35. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 273.
36. Id. The Jimenez court noted that other courts have construed goodwill payments as
compensation of a franchisee for the value of goodwill that a franchisor received when the
franchisor took over a franchisee's station. Id. at 272. The Jimenez court recognized that, if
a franchisor has appropriated a franchisee's goodwill by continuing to operate the deposed
franchisee's franchise, then the goodwill payments under state law compensate the franchisee
for lost goodwill. Id.
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or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises.17 The Jimenez court therefore concluded that because BP did not appropriate the plaintiffs' goodwill, if the
Fourth Circuit applied the Maryland Act's goodwill provision to BP's
complete market withdrawal, the goodwill provision of the Maryland Act
impermissibly would penalize BP.3 s
Second, in distinguishing the Jimenez facts from the facts before the
courts that have adopted the grounds/effects analysis, the Jimenez court
noted that, unlike the franchisee in at least one other case, the Jimenez
plaintiffs did not lose goodwill when BP withdrew from the plaintiffs'
market.3 9 In determining that the Jimenez plaintiffs did not lose goodwill,
the Fourth Circuit noted that after Crown purchased the BP franchises, the
plaintiffs continued to operate a franchised station. 40 The Fourth Circuit
further noted that the Jimenez plaintiffs did not lose goodwill because
Crown gave the plaintiffs the option to purchase the other stations that the
plaintiffs previously had operated .4 The Fourth Circuit then reasoned that
because the plaintiffs in Jimenez did not lose goodwill, BP's goodwill
payments to the plaintiffs, unlike the goodwill payments in at least one
other case, would not compensate the plaintiffs for goodwill that the
plaintiffs lost upon the franchisor's termination of the franchise.4 2
Third, the Fourth Circuit in Jimenez rejected other courts' narrow
interpretations of the PMPA's preemption clause because the Fourth Circuit
determined that the other courts incorrectly had interpreted the legislative
history of the PMPA. 43 The Jimenez court reasoned that other courts, in

37. Id. at 273; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2806(a) (1982) (stating PMPA's express preemption
of state laws that regulate penalties or remedies for violations of PMPA's termination or
nonrenewal provisions).
38. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 272. The Jimenez court reasoned that because BP did not
appropriate the plaintiffs' goodwill by conducting a market withdrawal, the Maryland Act's
goodwill provision, by requiring BP to compensate the plaintiffs for goodwill that BP did not
receive, would penalize BP. Id.
39. Id. at 273; see infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's
determination that because plaintiffs did not lose goodwill, BP's goodwill payments could not
compensate plaintiffs for lost goodwill); see also Bellmore v. Mobil Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 300,
305 (2d Cir. 1986) (concluding that because state act's goodwill provision compensated
franchisee for franchisee's lost goodwill, PMPA did not preempt state act's goodwill provision).
40. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 273. The Fourth Circuit in Jimenez contrasted the fact that in
Jimenez the plaintiffs continued to operate the plaintiffs' franchises, with the fact that in
Bellmore, because the franchisor failed to renew the franchises, the franchisees were no longer
operating any franchised stations. Id.; see also Bellmore, 783 F.2d at 303 (noting that
franchisor's failure to renew franchise agreement, because franchisor owned premises, left
franchisee without retail station). The Jimenez court concluded that, unlike the franchisees in
Jimenez, the franchisees in Bellmore lost the goodwill that the franchisees had established in
the business. Id.; see also Bellmore, 783 F.2d at 305 (noting that franchisor appropriated
franchisee's goodwill).
41. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 273.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 272-73; see infra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's
conclusion that PMPA's legislative history does not support other courts' narrow interpretation
of PMPA's scope of preemption); see also supra note 8 (listing other courts that have
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improperly analyzing Congress' intentions in enacting the PMPA, placed
undue emphasis on protecting franchisees' interests at the expense of franchisors' interests." The Jimenez court interpreted the legislative history of
the PMPA to indicate Congress' intention to prevent states, by enacting
legislation that is too adverse to the interests of franchisors, from disrupting
the PMPA's balance of interests between franchisors and franchisees. 4"
Finally, the Fourth Circuit in Jimenez reasoned that other courts, in
determining whether the PMPA preempts state law goodwill provisions,
incorrectly had failed to address the state legislatures' failure to accommodate franchisors' complete withdrawals from franchisees' markets. 46 The
Fourth Circuit noted that the PMPA expressly provides that franchisors
may withdraw completely from a market without incurring a penalty.47 The
Jimenez court further acknowledged that the Maryland Act, as well as
similar state acts which other courts have addressed, does not recognize the
unique circumstances of complete market withdrawals, but instead provides
for goodwill payments for all types of terminations or nonrenewals. 4" The
Fourth Circuit, therefore, concluded that, contrary to the decisions of other
courts, in the limited case of a franchisor's complete market withdrawal,
the PMPA preempts the goodwill provisions of state statutes that penalize
49
franchisors for conduct that the PMPA allows without penalty.
After refusing to adopt the grounds/effects analysis in the limited case
of a franchisor's complete market withdrawal, the Fourth Circuit in Jimenez
considered whether a grounds/effects analysis was an appropriate method
under any circumstances for determining the PMPA's scope of preemption.5 0

interpreted PMPA's legislative history and concluded that PMPA's scope of preemption is
narrow).
44. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 273.
45. Id. The Jimenez court observed that although other courts that have interpreted the
PMPA have emphasized the need to protect franchisees from manipulative franchisors, the
other courts have failed to give proper recognition to Congress' intention to allow franchisors
to terminate or to fail to renew franchises in response to changing economic conditions. Id.
46. Id.; see infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (discussing failure of state acts to
accommodate franchisors' complete market withdrawals when assessing goodwill payments on
franchisors for termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises).
47. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 273; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(E) (1982) (allowing
franchisor to terminate or fail to renew petroleum franchise based on franchisor's decision,
which decision franchisor made in good faith and in normal course of franchisor's business,
to withdraw completely from geographic market area).
48. See Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 273 (noting that Maryland Act provides for goodwill
payments on all types of terminations or nonrenewals); see also MD. CoM. LAw CODE ANN.
§11-304(i) (1983) (requiring franchisor to make goodwill payments to franchisee upon franchisor's termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchise for any reason except the franchisee's
material breach of franchise agreement).
49. See Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 273 (discussing Fourth Circuit's conclusion that Maryland
Act penalizes franchisors for conduct PMPA allows); supra notes 35-38 and accompanying
text (discussing Fourth Circuit's rationale for determining that Maryland Act penalizes BP for
conducting activity that PMPA allows without penalty).
50. See Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 272-73 (discussing reasons for Jimenez court's rejection of
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In deciding whether a grounds/effects analysis was an appropriate method
for determining the PMPA's scope of preemption, the Fourth Circuit
considered whether Congress intended the PMPA to preempt all state laws
that regulate any aspect of termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises. 5 In examining the PMPA's legislative history, the Fourth Circuit
noted that Congress, before enacting the PMPA, recognized the need for a
uniform set of guidelines that would govern termination and nonrenewal of
petroleum franchises. 2 The Fourth Circuit further noted that the broad
language that Congress used in discussing and drafting the PMPA's preemption clause indicated that Congress intended the PMPA to preempt state
laws that regulated any aspect, substantive or procedural, relating to the
termination and nonrenewal of petroleum franchises.5 3 The Jimenez court,
after applying a traditional supremacy clause analysis to the preemption
clause of the PMPA, 54 determined that Congress intended the PMPA to be
grounds/effects analysis); supra notes 29-49 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's
conclusion that grounds/effects analysis did not support plaintiffs' claim that PMPA does not
preempt Maryland Act's goodwill provision); infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's consideration of whether grounds/effects analysis was appropriate
method, under any circumstances, for determining PMPA's scope of preemption).
51. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 273.
52. Id. at 271. The Jimenez court, in examining the PMPA's legislative history, found
that the Senate Report for the PMPA stated that Congress recognized a need for a single set
of uniform rules that would control the grounds and notification procedures for the termination
and nonrenewal of petroleum franchises. Id. The Fourth Circuit further noted that Congress
enacted the PMPA to prevent franchisors, by threatening franchisees with termination or
nonrenewal of the franchisees' franchise agreements, from controlling franchisees' retail marketing policies. Id. The Fourth Circuit, however, also noted that Congress intended to allow
franchisors flexibility to withdraw from a geographic market in response to changing circumstances. Id. at 273.
53. Id. The Jimenez court noted that the PMPA's preemption clause prevents states
from adopting or enforcing any provisions of state laws "with respect to" termination or
nonrenewal of petroleum franchises. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 2806(a) (1982) (containing PMPA's
preemption clause). The Jimenez court also noted that the Senate Report stated that the
preemption clause of the PMPA applies to state laws "dealing with" termination or nonrenewal
of petroleum franchises. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 273. The Jimenez court, in determining that
Congress intended the PMPA to preempt state laws that regulate any aspect of termination
or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises, emphasized the broad scope of the words "with respect
to" in the PMPA's preemption clause and "dealing with" in the legislative history of the
PMPA. Id.
54. See supra note 5 (discussing traditional supremacy clause standards for determining
whether federal law preempts state laws). By analyzing the PMPA as a whole, including the
PMPA's legislative history, the Jimenez court applied traditional supremacy clause standards
to determine the congressional intent behind the PMPA's preemption clause. See generally
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (noting that courts should look to federal act
as a whole to determine extent of federal preemption of state laws). In further applying
traditional supremacy clause analysis to the facts in Jimenez, the Jimenez court determined
that the broad language that Congress used in the PMPA's preemption clause and legislative
history evidenced Congress' intent to preclude states from supplementing the PMPA's regulation
of termination or nonrenewa of petroleum franchises. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 273; see Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 20304 (1983) (noting that federal laws preempt state laws in given field if Congress has shown
intent to occupy field, thus precluding state regulation in field).
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the comprehensive and only source of government regulation of termination
and nonrenewal of petroleum franchises.5 The Fourth Circuit then concluded that because Congress intended the PMPA to be the only source of
regulation of the termination and nonrenewal of petroleum franchises, the
PMPA preempted the Maryland Act's goodwill provision.16 Consequently,
the Fourth Circuit held that, under the Maryland Act, the plaintiffs could
57

not recover goodwill payments from BP.

The Fourth Circuit in Jimenez properly determined that the PMPA

preempts the Maryland Act's goodwill provisions in the limited case of a
franchisor that conducts a complete market withdrawal.58 If courts enforce
state goodwill payment provisions against franchisors that intend to withdraw completely from a geographic market, the state goodwill provisions,

in violation of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution,
would interfere with Congress' objectives in enacting the PMPA. s9 In
enacting the PMPA, Congress intended to allow franchisors, without penalty, to alter in good faith the franchisors' marketing strategies in response
to adverse changes in market conditions. 60 The Fourth Circuit's conclusion
in Jimenez that the PMPA preempts state laws which require a franchisor
to pay a franchisee for the value of goodwill that the franchisee loses when
55. See Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 273 (discussing Fourth Circuit's conclusion that Congress
intended PMPA to be exclusive source for government regulation of franchise termination and
nonrenewal); supra note 54 (discussing Jimenez court's use of traditional supremacy clause
standards); supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussing Jimenez court's determination
that Congress intended PMPA to preempt all state laws that regulate termination or nonrenewal
of petroleum franchises).
56. Jimenez, 853 F.2d at 274.
57. Id.
58. See supra notes 29-49 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's conclusion
that PMPA preempted Maryland Act's goodwill provision in limited case of complete market
withdrawal); infra notes 59-78 and accompanying text (analyzing Fourth Circuit's conclusion
that, in limited case of complete market withdrawal, PMPA preempted Maryland Act's goodwill
provision).
59. See S. RP. No. 731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, 19, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmIh. NEws 873, 877 (recognizing importance of allowing franchisors adequate
flexibility to adapt to changing market conditions and consumer preferences); supra notes 4345 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's conclusion that goodwill provisions of
Maryland Act frustrate Congress' goal of allowing franchisors to react to economic changes
in market by withdrawing from market).
60. See S. REP. No. 731 at 37, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIn. Naws at
895-96 (discussing Congress' intent to allow franchisors to use franchisors' subjective good
faith in making decisions to terminate or to fail to renew petroleum franchises); 15 U.S.C. §
2802(b)(2)(E) (1982) (allowing franchisor to terminate franchise, without penalty, if franchisor
decides in good faith and in normal course of franchisor's business, to withdraw from
geographic market in response to changes in relevant facts and circumstances); see also Esso
Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 793 F.2d 431, 432 (1st Cir. 1986)
(noting that Congress intended PMPA to allow franchisor to use subjective good faith in
demanding changes to franchise agreement); Siecko v. Amerada Hess Corp., 569 F. Supp.
768, 771 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (noting that legislative history of PMPA establishes that franchisors'
subjective good faith, and not objective reasonableness of franchisors' acts, is proper standard
for franchisors' compliance with PMPA).
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the franchisor conducts a complete market withdrawal, therefore, is consis-

tent with Congress' intent to allow franchisors to withdraw completely from
a market without incurring a penalty. 61 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Jimenez that the PMPA preempts the Maryland Act's goodwill
provisions in the case of complete market withdrawals is consistent with
the holdings of other federal courts that the PMPA preempts state laws
that interfere with a franchisor's ability under the PMPA to terminate or

to fail to renew a petroleum franchise. 62
In determining that the PMPA, in the case of a complete market

withdrawal, preempts the goodwill provisions of the Maryland Act, the

Fourth Circuit properly distinguished the facts in Jimenez from the facts
that were before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Bellmore v. Mobil Oil Corp.63 In Bellmore, after the franchisee rejected
a new franchise proposal that increased the franchisee's rent, the franchisor
refused to renew the franchisee's franchise.64 The franchisee then brought

suit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut under
the Connecticut Gasoline Dealers Act (Connecticut Act). 65 The Bellmore

franchisee sought compensation from the franchisor for the fair market
value of the goodwill that the franchisee enjoyed when the franchisor refused

to renew the franchise agreement. 6 The district court in Bellmore, in
addressing the franchisee's claim, determined that the franchisee could,
under the Connecticut Act, recover goodwill compensation from the franchisor. 67 The Bellmore franchisor appealed the district court's decision to

61. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's conclusion
that PMPA preempts state laws which require goodwill payments upon franchisors' complete
market withdrawals); supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent to
allow franchisors to withdraw from market without incurring penalty).
62. See Humboldt Oil Co. v. Exxon Co., 823 F.2d 373, 375 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding
that PMPA preempted state law that allowed franchisee's assignment of franchise, because
assignment interfered with franchisor's right under PMPA to terminate operations with
franchisee), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1575 (1988); Continental Enters. v. American Oil Co.,
808 F.2d 24, 28 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that PMPA preempted state law because state law
allowed franchisee to bring suit after expiration of PMPA's statute of limitations); Consumers
Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 804 F.2d 907, 916 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that PMPA
preempted state law misrepresentation claim because such claim extended PMPA's notice
requirements for termination).
63. 783 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1986); see infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (analyzing
Fourth Circuit's distinction of Jimenez facts from Bellmore facts); infra notes 64-72 and
accompanying text (discussing facts and Second Circuit's reasoning in Bellmore).
64. Bellmore v. Mobil Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 300, 303 (2d Cir. 1986).
65. Bellmore, 783 F.2d at 303; see CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133()(b) (West 1987).
66. Bellmore, 783 F.2d at 303; see also CoNN. GaN. STAT. ANN. § 42-1330)(b) (West
1987) (requiring franchisor, upon termination or nonrenewal of franchise, to compensate
franchisee for value of franchisee's goodwill). In Bellmore the franchisee also sought, under
the PMPA, declaratory and injunctive relief that would prevent the franchisor from failing to
renew the franchisee's franchise agreement. Bellmore, 783 F.2d at 303.
67. See Bellmore, 783 F.2d at 303 (discussing district court's decision in Bellmore). In
Bellmore the district court determined that because the franchisor complied with the PMPA's
good faith requirement in demanding changes to the franchise agreement, the franchisor did
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 68
On appeal the franchisor in Bellmore contended that because the Connecticut Act's goodwill provisions related to the termination or nonrenewal
of petroleum franchises, the PMPA preempted the Connecticut Act's goodwill provisions. 69 In affirming the district court's holding that the PMPA
did not preempt the goodwill provisions of the Connecticut Act, the Second

Circuit determined that Congress intended the PMPA to protect franchisees
from franchisors' arbitrary and discriminatory terminations and nonrenewals
of franchises. 70 Furthermore, the Bellmore court determined that Congress
intended the PMPA to regulate only the grounds and procedures for

termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises, not the substantive
aspects of franchise relationships beyond such grounds and procedures for
termination and nonrenewal. 71 The Bellmore court concluded that the goodwill provisions of the Connecticut Act did not regulate the grounds, pro-

cedures, or notification requirements for termination or nonrenewal but
instead compensated franchisees for the value of the franchisees' goodwill
that franchisors appropriated
when franchisors terminated or failed to renew
72
the franchisees' franchises.

The Fourth Circuit in Jimenez properly distinguished Bellmore because,
although in Jimenez the franchisor withdrew completely from the market,

in Bellmore the franchisor did not withdraw from the market. 73 As the
Fourth Circuit in Jimenez correctly determined, BP, by conducting a complete market withdrawal, did not appropriate the plaintiffs' goodwill.7 4 BP

did not appropriate the plaintiffs' goodwill because, when Crown assumed
not violate the PMPA. Id. The district court in Bellmore, therefore, denied the franchisee's
claim for injunctive relief. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. In Bellmore the franchisor claimed on appeal that the legislative history of the
PMPA and the relevant case law would support a finding that the PMPA preempts state laws
that regulate any issue that relates to the termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises.
Id. at 304.
70. Id. In Bellmore the Second Circuit noted that Congress, in enacting the PMPA,
sought to minimize the strong bargaining position that franchisors held over franchisees. Id.
71. Id. at 305. In Bellmore the Second Circuit noted that the Senate Report for the
PMPA indicated that Congress, in drafting the PMPA, sought to establish a uniform set of
rules that would govern the grounds and notice requirements for termination and nonrenewal
of petroleum franchises. Id. The Bellmore court concluded that Congress did not intend the
PMPA to preempt state laws that regulate any aspects of petroleum franchises other than the
grounds and procedures for termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises. Id.
72. See id. (discussing Bellmore court's conclusion that Connecticut Act's goodwill
provision compensates franchisees for franchisees' lost goodwill). In Bellmore the Second
Circuit concluded that the Connecticut Act's goodwill provisions did not penalize the franchisor
but instead recognized the value of the franchisee's goodwill that the franchisor appropriated
when the franchisor terminated or failed to renew the franchisee's franchise. Id.
73. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (analyzing Fourth Circuit's distinction
of Jimenez facts from Bellmore facts); supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text (reporting
Fourth Circuit's reasons for distinguishing Jimenez facts from Bellmore facts).
74. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (reasoning that because BP conducted
complete market withdrawal, BP did not appropriate plaintiffs' goodwill).
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BP's interest in the plaintiffs' franchises, BP no longer was participating in
the operation of the franchises, and thus BP could not benefit from the
plaintiffs' goody'ill.71 In contrast, in Bellmore the franchisor, by remaining
in the franchisee's geographic market and transferring the deposed franchisee's business to a new franchisee, appropriated the goodwill that the
deposed franchisee had established.7 6 Thus, in Bellmore the franchisor's
goodwill payment to the franchisee compensated the franchisee for goodwill
that the franchisee adttlly had lost to the franchisor.77 In contrast, in
Jimenez BP's goodwill payment to the plaintiffs, by compensating the
plaintiffs for goodwill that the plaintiffs had not lost, would have penalized
78
BP in violation of the PMPA.
Although the Fourth Circuit in Jimenez properly interpreted the PMPA
to preempt state law if a franchisor completely withdraws from a franchisee's
market, the Fourth Circuit improperly interpreted the PMPA to preempt
state laws that regulate any aspect of termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises.7 9 The legislative history of the PMPA does not support
the Fourth Circuit's broad interpretation of the PMPA's scope of preemption.8 0 In enacting the PMPA, Congress, by protecting franchisees from
arbitrary and discriminatory terminations and nonrenewals, primarily intended to balance the interests of petroleum franchisors and franchisees.'

75. Jimenez v. BP Oil, Inc., 853 F.2d 268, 269 (4th Cir. 1988); see Bellmore, 783 F.2d
at 305 (reasoning that Connecticut legislature designed goodwill provision of Connecticut Act
to compensate franchisee for value of goodwill that franchisee established in business, which
goodwill franchisor received when franchisor terminated franchise).
76. See Bellmore, 783 F.2d at 305 (noting that franchisor received deposed franchisee's
goodwill).
77. See id. (discussing Second Circuit's conclusion that franchisor's goodwill payment
compensated franchisee for value of franchisee's goodwill that franchisor appropriated).
78. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's conclusion
that Maryland Act's goodwill provision impermissibly penalizes BP for withdrawing from
market); supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text (noting that in Bellmore the franchisor's
goodwill payments to franchisee were not penalty but were instead compensation for goodwill
franchisor appropriated from franchisee).
79. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text (analyzing Fourth Circuit's broad
interpretation of PMPA's scope of preemption); supra notes 50-57 and accompanying teit
(discussing Fourth Circuit's conclusion that PMPA preempts state law that regulates any aspect
of termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises).
80. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (supporting conclusion that Congress
did not intend PMPA's preemption clause to have broad scope of preemption).
81. See S. REP. No. 731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, 17, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMv. NEWs 873, 875-76 (discussing Congress' rationale for protecting franchisees
from arbitrary and discriminatory termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises). The
Senate Report notes that franchisors' strong bargaining positions in negotiating franchise
agreements led to franchise agreements that imposed onerous terns on franchisees. Id. at 17,
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 876. The Senate Report further notes that franchisors
often drafted franchise agreements that allowed franchisors to terminate or to fail to renew
franchise agreements if a franchisee breached only an onerous or minor provision of the
franchise agreement. Id. at 17-18, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMU4. NEws at 875-76. The
Senate Report concludes that franchisees needed statutory protection in the form of restrictions
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In an attempt to achieve a balance of interests, Congress established in the
provisions of the PMPA an exhaustive list of the grounds and procedures
that franchisors may use in terminating or failing to renew a petroleum
franchise. 82 Congress, however, intended to allow states to continue regu-

lating the substantive aspects of the operation of petroleum franchises."
Because the PMPA protects franchisees from arbitrary and discriminatory

terminations and nonrenewals, and because a broad preemptive scope would
interfere with state legislatures' protection of franchisees, the preemptive
scope of the PMPA should extend only to regulating grounds and procedures

for termination or nonrenewal.8 4 The Fourth Circuit's broad interpretation
of the preemptive scope of the PMPA, by eliminating many statutorial

protections that franchisees may have under state laws, thwarts Congress'

on the permissible grounds and procedures for termination or nonrenewal of franchise agreements. Id.; see also Barnes v. Gulf Oil Corp., 795 F.2d 358, 360 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that
Congress designed PMPA to protect franchisees from arbitrary or discriminatory termination
or nonrenewal); Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 793 F.2d 431,
434 (lst Cir. 1986) (same); Bellmore v. Mobil Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1986)

(same).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b) (1982) (establishing exhaustive list of grounds upon which
franchisor may terminate or fail to renew franchise agreement); S. REp. No. 731 at 18, 1978
U.S. CODE CONa. & ADrm. NEws at 876 (discussing necessity of providing exhaustive list in
PMPA of permissible grounds for termination); Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Department of
Consumer Affairs, 793 F.2d 431, 434 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting that PMPA, in preventing
arbitrary and discriminatory terminations and nonrenewals, contains exhaustive list of grounds
for termination or nonrenewal).
83. See Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 793 F.2d 431, 43435 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that Congress did not intend PMPA to preempt state laws that
regulate elements of franchise agreements other than grounds and procedures for termination
or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises); Bellmore v. Mobil Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 300, 305 (2d
Cir. 1986) (determining that conclusion that PMPA preempts state laws which regulate areas
that Congress left to control of states is contrary to Congress' purpose in enacting PMPA);
Exxon Corp. v. Georgia Ass'n of Petroleum Retailers, 484 F. Supp. 1008, 1017 (N.D. Ga.
1979) (holding that states may regulate aspects of petroleum franchises other than aspects
Congress specifically drafted PMPA to cover), aff'd sub nom. Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644
F.2d 1030 (5th Cir.) (affirmed on different grounds), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 932 (1981); Lasko
v. Consumers Petroleum of Conn., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 211, 216 (D. Conn. 1981) (holding that
Congress did not intend to preempt all state laws that regulate substantive aspects of petroleum
franchises).
84. See Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 793 F.2d 431, 436
(1st Cir. 1986) (holding that PMPA did not preempt state law that placed limits on amount
of rent franchisor may charge franchisee); Bellmore v. Mobil Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 300, 30406 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that PMPA did not preempt state law that required franchisor to
compensate franchisee for value of franchisee's goodwill that franchisor received upon franchisor's failure to renew franchise agreement); Exxon Corp. v. Georgia Ass'n of Petroleum
Retailers, 484 F. Supp. 1008, 1018 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (holding that PMPA did not preempt
state law that limited business hours during which franchisor may require franchisee to operate
franchise), aff'd sub nom. Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir.) (affirmed on
different grounds), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1981); Lasko v. Consumers Petroleum of
Conn., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 211, 216-17 (D. Conn. 1981) (holding that PMPA did not preempt
state law that required petroleum franchises to have minimum three year duration with
automatic renewal unless parties properly terminated franchise agreement).
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intent to ensure protection of franchisees from abusive franchisors8 5
The Fourth Circuit's broad interpretation of the preemptive scope of

the PMPA in Jimenez has several distinct implications for parties to
petroleum franchises both within and outside of the Fourth Circuit.86 First,
the decision of the Fourth Circuit in Jimenez extends a split in judicial
interpretations of the PMPA among federal circuit courts. 7 The split
between judicial interpretations of the PMPA's scope of preemption hampers

achievement of Congress' goal under the PMPA to create a uniform system
for regulating petroleum franchises.88 Second, after Jimenez, the balance
between the interests of franchisors and the interests of franchisees in the
Fourth Circuit is less proportionate than the balance of interests between
franchisors and franchisees in other circuits. 9 The Fourth Circuit's decision
in Jimenez hampers the legislatures of states in the Fourth Circuit that wish
to protect the interests of local franchisees against the dominating influence
of out-of-state franchisors. 9° By preventing the states in the Fourth Circuit

from regulating elements of petroleum franchises other than the grounds,
procedures, and notice requirements for termination or nonrenewal, the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Jimenez reduces the states' ability to protect
franchisees from unfair franchise agreements that are subject only to a
standard of the franchisors' subjective good faith. 9'

85. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text (reasoning that broad preemptive scope
of PMPA thwarts Congress' intent to protect franchisees from powerful franchisors).
86. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (discussing implications of Fourth
Circuit's decision in Jimenez).
87. Compare Jimenez v. BP Oil, Inc., 853 F.2d 268, 273 (4th Cir. 1988) (adopting broad
reading of scope of PMPA's preemption clause and preventing states from regulating any
aspect of termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises) and In re Herbert, 806 F.2d
889, 894 (9th Cir. 1986) (same) with Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Consumer
Affairs, 793 F.2d 431, 435 (1st Cir. 1986) (interpreting narrowly preemptive scope of PMPA
and allowing states to regulate any aspect of petroleum franchises other than grounds and
procedures for termination and nonrenewal) and Bellmore v. Mobil Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 300,
305 (2d Cir. 1986) (same).
88. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' goal, in enacting
PMPA, to create uniform system for regulation of petroleum franchises).
89. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' recognition of
need to protect franchisees from franchisors' strong bargaining position in franchise agreements); infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (discussing how Fourth Circuit's decision in
Jimenez favors interests of franchisors over interests of franchisees).
90. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (establishing that allowing states to
regulate substantive elements of franchises protects franchisees from onerous franchise agreements).
91. See Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 793 F.2d 431, 434
(1st Cir. 1986) (noting that Congress intended PMPA to balance interests of franchisors and
franchisees). The Esso court noted that Congress, in enacting the PMPA, intended to limit
franchisors' ability to terminate or to fail to renew petroleum franchises but allowed franchisors
to use the franchisors' subjective good faith in changing terms of franchise agreements. Id.;
see also S. REP.No. 731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, 37, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CNOr. &
ADMN. NEws 873, 895-96 (discussing franchisors' ability under PMPA to follow standard of
subjective good faith in permissibly terminating or in failing to renew petroleum franchises).
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In Jimenez the Fourth Circuit ruled that the PMPA preempted the
goodwill provision of the Maryland ActY2 In holding that the PMPA
preempts the Maryland Act's goodwill provision, the Fourth Circuit determined that the PMPA broadly preempts all state laws that regulate any

aspect of termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises. 93 Because in
the limited case of a franchisor's complete withdrawal from the franchisee's

market a goodwill payment penalizes the franchisor and contravenes the
terms of the PMPA, the Fourth Circuit in Jimenez correctly determined
that the PMPA preempts state laws that require a franchisor to make
goodwill payments to a franchisee.9 4 The Fourth Circuit, however, incorrectly

determined that the PMPA preempts state laws that regulate any aspect of
termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises. 95 In adopting a broad
interpretation of the preemption clause of the PMPA, the Fourth Circuit
has allowed courts in the Fourth Circuit impermissibly to hamper state

legislatures' ability to protect franchisees.9 6 Moreover, the Jimenez court,

by interpreting broadly the PMPA's scope of preemption, has added to a

split in reasoning among the federal circuit courts that have addressed the
scope of the PMPA's preemption clause. 97 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit
in Jimenez has interfered with Congress' goal under the PMPA of estab-

lishing a uniform system for regulating the termination or nonrenewal of
petroleum franchises. 98 Finally, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Jimenez, by
reducing states' ability to provide franchisees with protection against abusive
franchisors, impermissibly interferes with Congress' goal, under the PMPA,
to balance the interests of petroleum franchisors and franchisees. 99
ROBERT

K.

GiNTHER

92. Jimenez v. BP Oil, Inc., 853 F.2d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 1988).

93. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's conclusion
that PMPA preempts state laws that regulate any aspect of termination or nonrenewal of
petroleum franchises).
94. See supra notes 58-78 and accompanying text (supporting Fourth Circuit's conclusion
that PMPA preempts, in limited case of franchisor's complete market withdrawal, goodwill
provisions of the Maryland Act).
95. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (criticizing Fourth Circuit's conclusion
that PMPA preempts state laws that regulate any aspect of termination or nonrenewal of
petroleum franchises).
96. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (asserting that PMPA's broad scope
of preemption over state laws interferes with state legislatures' protection of franchisees).
97. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (noting that Fourth Circuit's decision in
Jimenez extends split in judicial interpretations of preemptive scope of PMPA).
98. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (noting that split in judicial interpretations
of PMPA's scope of preemption interferes with Congress' goal under PMPA to create uniform
system for regulation of termination or nonrenewal of petroleum franchises).
99. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing implications of Fourth
Circuit's broad interpretation of PMPA's scope of preemption).

